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Abstract—This paper describes MessageGuard, a
browser-based platform for research into usable
content-based encryption. MessageGuard is designed to
enable collaboration between security and usability
researchers on long-standing research questions in this area.
It significantly simplifies the effort required to work in this
space and provides a place for research results to be shared,
replicated, and compared with minimal confounding factors.
MessageGuard provides ubiquitous encryption and secure
cryptographic operations, enabling research on any existing
web application, with realistic usability studies on a secure
platform. We validate MessageGuard’s compatibility and
performance, and we illustrate its utility with case studies for
Gmail and Facebook Chat.
1. Introduction
Users share private information on the web through a
variety of applications, such as email, instant messaging,
social media, and document sharing. HTTPS protects this
information during transmission, but does not protect
users’ data while at rest. Additionally, middleboxes can
weaken HTTPS connections by failing to properly
implement TLS or adequately validate certificate
chains [1]. Even if a website correctly employs HTTPS
and encrypts user data while at rest, the user’s data is still
vulnerable to honest-but-curious data mining [2],
third-party library misbehavior [3], website hacking,
protocol attacks [4], [5], [6], and government subpoena.
This state of affairs motivates the need for
content-based encryption of user data. In content-based
encryption, users’ sensitive data is encrypted at their own
computer and only decrypted once it reaches the intended
recipient, remaining opaque to the websites that store or
transmit this encrypted data. The best known examples of
content-based encryption are secure email (e.g., PGP,
S/MIME) and secure instant messaging (e.g., OTR). In
addition to protecting communication, content-based
encryption can protect any data users store or distribute
online; for example, files stored in the cloud (e.g.,
DropBox, Google Drive) or tasks in a web-based to-do list.
Unfortunately, while there is a large body of work on
messaging protocols and key management schemes for
content-based encryption [7], too little of it has been
subjected to formal usability evaluation. This is
problematic as experience has shown that many proposals
with strong theoretical foundations are either unfeasible in
real-world situations [8] or have problems that are only
apparent when studied empirically [9], [10], [11]. As a
result, there are many open HCI and security questions
regarding content-based encryption [12].
1.1. MessageGuard
To address these concerns, we have developed
MessageGuard, a platform for usable security research
focused on content-based encryption. Currently,
participating in research of this area has been a costly
affair, requiring researchers to either build a system from
scratch [13], [14] or to make substantial modifications to
one of the existing open source tools [15].1 MessageGuard
is designed to greatly simplify the effort required to
develop usable content-based encryption Ultimately, we
hope that MessageGuard will enable collaboration between
applied cryptography and usability researchers, allowing
them to solve the long-standing open questions in this
field, such as the creation of usable and secure key
management.
The benefits of MessageGuard include:
1) Accelerates the creation of content-based encryption
prototypes. MessageGuard provides a fully functional
content-based encryption system, including user
interfaces, messaging protocols, and key management
schemes. The modular design of MessageGuard
allows researchers to easily modify only the portions
of the system they wish to experiment with, while the
remaining portions continue operating as intended.
This simplifies development and allows researchers to
focus on their areas of expertise — either usability or
security.
2) Provides a platform for sharing research results.
Researchers who create prototypes using
MessageGuard can share their specialized interfaces,
protocols, or key management schemes as one or
more patches,2, allowing other researchers to leverage
1. Substantial modifications are needed because existing open source
content-based encryption tools are unusable [16].
2. A diff-based patch of MessageGuard’s code base.
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and replicate their work. Additionally, successful
research that would benefit all MessageGuard
prototypes can be merged into MessageGuard’s code
base, allowing the community to benefit from these
advances and reducing fragmentation of efforts.
3) Simplifies the comparison of competing designs.
MessageGuard can be used to rapidly develop
prototypes for use in A/B testing [17]. Two
prototypes built using MessageGuard will only differ
in the areas that have been modified by researchers.
This helps limit the confounding factors that have
proven problematic in past comparisons of
content-based encryption systems [2], [15], [18]. The
usability studies reported in this paper provide a
baseline for comparison against future work built on
MessageGuard.
4) Retrofits existing web applications with content-based
encryption. Because MessageGuard works with all
websites, in all browsers, and on both desktop and
mobile platforms, it enables researchers to design
usable content-based encryption for a wide variety of
applications. Researchers do not need to cooperate
with application developers or service providers,
allowing them to easily work on systems that have
large, installed user bases. This removes a
confounding factor when conducting user studies,
since users will be familiar with the application they
are using. It also enables long-term usability studies,
with users interact with encryption as part of their
daily habits.
5) Provides secure cryptographic operations for all
applications. MessageGuard uses security overlays [2]
to isolate a user’s sensitive content from web
applications, ensuring that only an encrypted copy of
the user’s data is available to those web applications.
Thus MessageGuard enables HCI researchers to
easily test their ideas with applications that are
actually secure, rather than relying on mock-systems,
which could run the risk of invalidating their results.
In this paper we describe the MessageGuard platform,
including our threat model, system goals, and
implementation details. Our contributions include the
following items. (1) A description of the MessageGuard
platform and a guide for how researchers can use it to
develop usable, content-based encryption for existing web
applications. (2) Development of the first content-based
encryption system that is designed to work with all
websites, in all browsers, and on both desktop and mobile
platforms. (3) A validation of MessageGuard’s
compatibility and performance, showing that it supports all
of the Alexa Top 50 (e.g., Facebook, Instagram, Twitter)
websites with little impact on page load times. (4) Two
case studies that illustrate how MessageGuard meets its
design objectives, including six usability studies with 203
participants demonstrating that users find the prototypes
we built using MessageGuard to be highly usable.
1.2. Areas of Potential Research
MessageGuard enables researchers to examine diverse
applications of content-based encryption in web
applications. For example, MessageGuard can be used to
improve existing forms of content-based encryption such
as secure email or secure chat. Alternatively, researchers
could use MessageGuard to evaluate the feasibility of
adding content-based encryption to web applications in
novel contexts, such as signing Tweets for highly-targeted
Twitter accounts or securing cloud storage.
Researchers can use MessageGuard to implement new
interfaces, protocols, algorithms, and key management
schemes while leveraging MessageGuard’s existing usable
interfaces and security features. Prototypes built with these
new research features can be evaluated empirically,
measuring the effect that they have on the user experience.
Potential areas of exploration and collaboration for
security and HCI researchers include, but are not limited
to: (a) designing content-based encryption interfaces that
are resilient to spoofing; (b) exploring messaging protocols
and key management schemes for content-based
encryption; for example, certificate revocation, certificate
transparency, key ratcheting, puncturable encryption; (c)
developing instructive interfaces that help users build
correct mental models of content-based encryption; (d)
investigating key escalation, which starts users on an
easy-to-use, but less secure form of key management (e.g.,
passwords) and then migrates them to a more secure key
management scheme (e.g., PGP) as they gain expertise; (e)
creating interfaces that help users avoid mistakenly
sending sensitive data in the clear; (f) supporting
easy-to-use key discovery for traditional public key
cryptography (e.g., PGP); (g) notifying users of potential
insecurities regarding their encrypted content; and (h)
assisting users in migrating their encryption keys between
devices they own.
2. Related Work
Unger et al. [7] provide a comprehensive overview of
secure messaging protocols, which use content-based
encryption, and discuss a variety of key management
schemes. Unger et al.’s work demonstrates that there is
strong interest in content-based encryption within the
security community. Still, examining the systems
highlighted by Unger et al.’s survey makes it clear that few
proposals have ever undergone user studies, making clear
the need for a platform to easily prototype and test these
proposals.
2.1. Security Overlays
There have been several systems that have used
security overlays [2], [19] to enhance existing web
applications with content-based encryption: Fahl et al. [13]
describe Confidentiality-as-a-Service (CaaS), a system
designed to make it easy for users to encrypt their
sensitive data stored in the cloud. CaaS uses
Greasemonkey, a Mozilla Firefox extension, to add
encryption capabilities to existing web pages. The paper
describes proof-of-concept implementations of CaaS for
Dropbox, Facebook, and email.
He et al. [14] proposed ShadowCrypt, a Google
Chrome extension that sits between the user and their web
services and allows the users to create and consume
encrypted content without revealing the content to the web
service. ShadowCrypt displays encrypted contents using
the Shadow DOM, an upcoming HTML5 standard.3
Unfortunately, as discussed in Appendix §1, several flaws
compromise the security of this approach.
Lau et al. [20] present Mimesis Aegis (M-Aegis), a
privacy-preserving system for mobile platforms. M-Aegis
places a transparent window on top of the application GUI
in order to intercept and encrypt data before it reaches the
native application. M-Aegis uses a novel design that
utilizes features of the accessibility layer of the operating
system in order to overlay the interface of any application.
To our knowledge, M-Aegis is the first system that
attempts to provide ubiquitous and integrated encryption
outside of the browser. A prototype implementation of
M-Aegis overlaying Gmail was part of a study with 15
participants that showed most of the participants did not
report any noticeable difference between the original app
and the app with M-Aegis enabled.
In comparison to these systems, MessageGuard is the
first system that is capable of supporting content-based
encryption using security overlays across all desktop and
mobile platforms. A more in-depth evaluation of these
systems, their strengths and weaknesses can be found in
Appendix A.
2.2. Other approaches
In contrast to using security overlays, there are systems
that attempt to provide content-based encryption through a
combination of modifying the browser and modifying
existing web applications.
In this first category, COWL modifies the JavaScript
runtime to provide confinement between different scripts,
enforcing mandatory access control [3]. For example, this
allows untrusted JavaScript, such as a third-party library,
to compute over sensitive data but not to transmit that data
to an untrusted server. This provides powerful capabilities
to the browser, enabling content-based encryption to be
widely supported, but requires modifications to JavaScript
and cooperation from the application provider. Hails
provides a similar confinement system, written in
Haskell [21]. Approaches that require a new runtime are
still largely theoretical and may struggle to cope with
complex web applications.
In this second category, Content Cloaking provides a
browser extension recognizes and intercepts AJAX
requests that the web application makes to the content
3. Only blink-based browsers support the Shadow DOM.
provider. The extension then encrypts data as it leaves the
browser and is sent to a content-provider, and then
decrypts data when it arrives from the provider and before
it is displayed by the browser. This must be customized
for each web application, and was only demonstrated for
Google Docs. Similarly, Beeswax requires tight
cooperation between application developers and the
security platform [22]. Developers must indicate which
DOM elements should be kept private and which users can
share the contents of those elements, and then the platform
provides cryptographic operations and key management.
In comparison to these systems, MessageGuard does
not require cooperation from web applications. This is an
important distinction for two reasons: (1) modifying
individual applications does not scale with the explosive
growth of web applications, and (2) requiring cooperation
from web developers severely limits the ability of
researchers to explore content-based encryption in the
applications that most interest them. For these reasons, in
this paper we focus on adding content-based encryption
using secure overlays.
3. Ubiquitous, Content-Based Encryption
In this section, we give the threat model that motivates
our work. Next, we describe how security overlays can be
used to enhance existing web applications with
content-based encryption. Finally, we discuss our goals for
MessageGuard, that are necessary to support research of
content-based encryption in a usable, secure, and
extensible manner.
3.1. Threat Model
In content-based encryption, sensitive content is only
accessible to the author of that data and the intended
recipient. In contrast to transport-level encryption (e.g.,
TLS), which only protects data during transit,
content-based encryption protects data both during transit
and while it is at rest. In our threat model, we consider
web applications, middleboxes (e.g. CDNs), and the
content they serve to be within the control of the
adversary. The adversary wins if she is able to use these
resources to access the user’s encrypted data. While it is
true that most websites are not malicious,4 in order to
support ubiquitous, content-based encryption, it is
necessary to protect against cases where websites are
actively trying to steal user content. Users’ computers,
operating systems, software, and content-based encryption
software5 are all considered part of the trusted computing
base in our threat model.
Our threat model is concerned with ensuring the
confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of encrypted
data, but does allow for the leakage of meta-data necessary
4. Many websites are best described as honest-but-curious.
5. This includes the software’s website and any web services the software
relies upon (e.g., a key server).
Portions of the web application (shown on the left) have
been overlayed with secure interfaces (shown on the right).
Figure 1. Overlaying a web application
for the encrypted data to be transmitted and/or stored by
the underlying web application. For example, in order to
transmit an encrypted email message, the webmail system
must have access to the unencrypted email addresses of
the message’s recipient. Additionally, the webmail provider
will be able to inspect the encrypted package and gain
learn basic information about the encrypted package (e.g.,
approximate length of message, number of recipients).6
While our threat model is necessarily strict to support
the wide range of web applications that researchers may
wish to investigate, we note that research prototypes built
using the MessageGuard platform are free to adopt a weaker
threat model that may be more appropriate for that particular
research.
3.2. Security Overlays
To encrypt user data before it reaches web applications,
we leverage a technique known as overlaying [2], [19]. In
this technique, MessageGuard replaces portions of the web
application’s interface with secure interfaces known as
overlays (see Figure 1).7 While a security overlay appears
to be a part of the web application, the security overlay
itself is inaccessible to the web application.
There are several approaches for implementing
overlays: iFrames [2], [19], the ShadowDOM [14],
Greasemonkey [13], and the operating system’s
accessibility framework [20]. An in-depth analysis of each
of these approaches can be found in Appendix §1. Based
on our analysis of each of these approaches, iFrames are
the implementation strategy best suited to work across all
operating systems and browsers (including mobile).
Additionally, iFrame-based security overlays have
security and usability that are greater than or equal to that
of other approaches. As such, we designed MessageGuard
using security overlays based on iFrames.
Relying on iFrames largely restrict MessageGuard to
supporting only web applications deployed in the browser.
6. This type of leakage also occurs in HTTPS.
7. The overlayed elements are not actually removed, but visually
occluded by the secure overlays.
Still the browser is an ideal location for studying
content-based encryption: (1) There are a large number of
high usage browser-based web applications (e.g., webmail,
Google Docs). (2) Traditional desktop and mobile
application development increasingly mimics web
development, allowing lessons learned in browser-based
researcher to also apply to these other platforms. (3) There
is already a substantial amount of research into adding
content-based encryption to web applications, both
academic (e.g., [2], [13], [14], [15]) and professional (e.g.,
Virtru, Mailvelope, Encipher.it).
3.3. Platform Goals
We examined the existing work on content-based
encryption (e.g., [7], [9], [23], [24]) in order to establish a
set of design goals for MessageGuard. These goals are
centered around enabling to researcher to conduct research
into usable, content-based encryption.
3.3.1. Secure. MessageGuard should secure users’ sensitive
content from web applications and network adversaries.
MessageGuard should protect data in its overlays from
being accessed by the web application. Sensitive data that
is being created or consumed using MessageGuard should
be inaccessible to the web application which
MessageGuard has secured. A corollary to this rule is that
no entities that observe the transmission of data encrypted
by MessageGuard should be able to decipher that data
unless they are the intended recipients.
MessageGuard’s interfaces should be clearly
distinguishable from the web application’s interfaces. In
addition to protecting content-based messages from
websites, it is important that systems clearly delineate
which interfaces belong to the website and which belong
to the content-based encryption software. This helps users
to feel assured that their data is being protected and assists
them in avoiding mistakes [2], [17]. Additionally, visual
indicators should be included that can help protect against
an adversary that attempts to social engineer a user into
believing they are entering text into a secure interface
when in reality they are entering text directly into the
adversary’s interface [10], [25].
3.3.2. Usable. MessageGuard should provide a usable base
for future research efforts.
MessageGuard should be approachable to novice
users. Easy-to-use systems are more likely to be adopted
by the public at large [7]. Furthermore, complicated
systems foster user errors, decreasing system security [2],
[9]. While some systems need to expose users to complex
security choices, basic functionality (e.g., sending or
receiving an encrypted email) should be approachable to
new users. At a minimum this includes building intuitive
interfaces, providing integrated, context-sensitive tutorials,
and helping first time recipients of encrypted messages
understand what they need to do in order to decrypt their
message.
MessageGuard should integrate with existing web
applications. Users enjoy the web services and
applications they are currently using and are disinclined to
adopt a new system solely because it offers greater
security. Instead, users prefer that content-based encryption
be integrated into their existing applications [2], [15].
Equally important, content-based encryption should have a
minimal effect on the application’s user experience; if
encryption gets in the way of users completing tasks it is
more likely that they will turn off content-based
encryption [26].
MessageGuard’s interfaces should be usable at any
size. Current web interfaces allowing users to consume or
create content come in a wide variety of sizes (i.e., height
and width). When MessageGuard integrates with these
web services, it is important that MessageGuard’s
interfaces work at these same sizes. To support the widest
range of sizes, MessageGuard’s interfaces should react to
the space available, providing as much functionality as is
possible at that display size.
3.3.3. Ubiquitous. MessageGuard should support most
websites and platforms.
MessageGuard should work with most websites
MessageGuard should make it easy for researchers to
explore adding end-to-end encryption into whichever web
applications they are interested in. While it may be
impossible to fully support all web applications (e.g.,
Flash applications or applications drawn using an HTML
canvas), most standard web applications should work
out-of-the-box. For those applications which don’t work
out-of-the-box, MessageGuard should allow researchers to
create customized prototypes that handle these edge cases.
MessageGuard should function in all major desktop
and mobile browsers. Prototypes built with MessageGuard
should function both on desktop and mobile browsers,
allowing researchers to experiment with both of these form
factors. Furthermore, MessageGuard should work on all
major browsers, allowing users to work with the web
browser they are most familiar with, obviating the need to
restrict study recruitment to users of a specific browser.
3.3.4. Extensible. MessageGuard should be easily
extensible and contribute to the rapid development of
content-based encryption prototypes.
MessageGuard should be modular. MessageGuard’s
functionality should be split into a variety of modules,
with each module taking care of a specific function.
Researchers should also be free to only change the
modules that relate to their research, and have the system
continue to function as expected. Similarly,
MessageGuard’s modules should be extensible, allowing
researchers to create new custom modules with a minimal
amount of effort.
MessageGuard should provide reference functionality.
As a base for other researchers’ work, MessageGuard
should include a reference implementation of the various
modules that adds content-based encryption to a wide
range of web applications. This reference implementation
should be able to be easily modified and extended to allow
researchers to rapidly implement their own ideas.
3.3.5. Reliable. The usability and security of
MessageGuard should be reliable, protecting researchers
from unintentionally compromising MessageGuard’s
security or usability.
Reducing the security of MessageGuard should require
deliberate intent. HCI researchers should feel comfortable
customizing MessageGuard’s interface without needing to
worry that they are compromising security. To facilitate
this, MessageGuard should separate UI and security
functionality into separate components. As long as
researchers limit themselves to changing only UI
components, there should be no effect on security.
Modifying the cryptographic primitives should have
minimal effect of MessageGuard’s usability. As above,
MessageGuard should separate its UI and security
functionality into separate components. This will allow
security researchers to modify the cryptographic primitives
without worrying about how they will affect
MessageGuard’s usability. The one caveat to this is if a
new key management scheme requires a user interface that
MessageGuard does not already make available. In this
case, researchers will need to provide this key
management scheme’s interface, which could affect
usability, but other interfaces should remain unaffected.
4. MessageGuard
Based on our design goals and using iFrame-based
security overlays we created MessageGuard. Figure 2 shows
an overview of MessageGuard’s architecture.
All source code related to MessageGuard can be found
at https://bitbucket.org/isrlemail/messageguard. An example
secure email prototype built using MessageGuard can be
found at https://messageguard.io.8
In the remainder of this section, we first describe
MessageGuard’s workflow. We then detail the design of
MessageGuard’s core components, and describe
MessageGuard’s default functionality.9 We then discuss
several web service (i.e., key server, encrypted file server)
we have created to further aid researchers in building
solutions using MessageGuard. Finally, we give a brief
overview of MessageGuard’s implementation.
4.1. Workflow
MessageGuard’s workflow is as follows:
1) MessageGuard injects the front end component into
the website’s front end. MessageGuard’s front end
8. This prototype secures email sent and received through Gmail and
uses PGP-based key management. Similar prototypes that secure email
using passwords or identity-based encryption are also available upon
request.
9. Per-application customization is discussed in §5.
User’s sensitive data is only accessible within the MessageGuard
origin.
Figure 2. Overview of MessageGuard architecture.
Figure 3. Generic Read overlay.
component scans for encrypted payloads and data
entry interfaces. When found, it replaces these items
with an overlay. After this initial scan, changes to the
page are tracked and only elements that have been
modified are scanned.
2) Read overlays are used to display sensitive
information to the user, and a compose overlay allows
users to encrypt sensitive information before sending
it to the website. Each overlay is displayed within an
iframe and uses the browser’s same-origin policy to
protect its contents from the website. Overlays use
the packager component to handle the actual
encryption/decryption and packaging of data.
3) In conjunction with the key management component,
the packager encrypts and decrypts data. The
packager also encodes encrypted data, making it
suitable for transmission to and from the website’s
front end.
4.2. Front End
MessageGuard’s front end component is injected into
every website. The front end has three responsibilities:
1) Identify encrypted payloads. The front end
identifies encrypted payloads, overlays these payloads
with a read overlay, and sends the payloads to the
overlay so that they can be decrypted and displayed
to the user (Figure 3).
2) Identify data entry interfaces. The front end
identifies interfaces where the user may wish to enter
encrypted data (e.g., [contentEditable] and
textarea elements). Each of these interfaces are
then modified to display a button that users can click
Figure 4. 4
Generic Compose overlay.
to replace the interface with a compose overlay
(Figure 4).The front end also creates an overlay
manager for each overlay that handles passing data
between the the compose overlay and the website
(e.g., sending the overlay the encrypted payload,
saving drafts).
3) Displaying context-sensitive tutorials. The front end
displays tutorials that instruct new users how to use
MessageGuard. These are all context-sensitive,
appearing as the user performs a given task for the
first time.
The front end is the only MessageGuard component
that runs outside of MessageGuard’s protected origin. For
this reason, MessageGuard is designed to treat the front
end as untrusted. Since the front end component does not
exist as part of MessageGuard’s protected origin, it cannot
directly access the packager, key management, or overlay
components. Instead, it is limited to communicating with
the overlay component using the web messaging API [27].
Additionally, the overlay always encrypts user data before
transmitting it to the front end component and sanitizes
any data it receives from the front end.
4.2.1. Default Functionality. MessageGuard’s default
front end modifies all web applications to allow for
content-based encryption. The default front end will create
a read overlay for encrypted payloads found anywhere on
the page. It will also allow encryption in all larger textual
entry interface elements (i.e., [contentEditable] and
textarea elements). The front end also contains generic
tutorials, which are shown when users first encounter new
functionality in MessageGuard.
4.3. Overlays
MessageGuard’s overlays are designed to mimic the
placement and dimensions of the content they overlay and
to be visually appealing and intuitive. Overlays have a
distinctive, dark color scheme that stands out from most
websites, allowing users to easily identify secure overlays
from insecure website interfaces. Finally, overlays sanitize
the plaintext contents of encrypted messages in order to
prevent malicious messages from compromising the
overlay.
Figure 5. Generic read overlay in constrained space.
Figure 6. Generic compose overlay in constrained space.
4.3.1. Default Functionality. MessageGuard includes two
standard overlays: a read overlay (Figure 3) and a compose
overlay (Figure 4).10 Read overlays are responsible for
decrypting and displaying sensitive information to users.
Compose overlays allow users to compose rich text
messages and encrypt these messages before sending them
to the website. Both overlays are reactive and modify their
layout based on available space. For example, at small
sizes, the compose overlay no longer shows tools for
formatting text, but still allows their use through keyboard
shortcuts (see Figure 5 and Figure 6).
4.4. Packager
The packager encrypts/decrypts user data and encodes
the encrypted data to make it suitable for transmission
through web applications. The packager uses standard
cryptographic primitives and techniques to encrypt/decrypt
data (e.g., AES-GCM). Ciphertext is packaged with all
information necessary for recipients of the message to
decrypt it.
4.4.1. Default Functionality. MessageGuard’s default
packager is based on the Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS) [28] used in S/MIME. It differs from CMS in that
all non-essential attributes (e.g., versioning information)
are removed. This was done to reduce the package size,
which is necessary for MessageGuard to support web
applications that constrain the size of packages (e.g., chat
applications).
4.5. Key Management
MessageGuard’s key management component provides
a UI (displayed in MessageGuard’s options page) that lists
the keys currently available to the user and allows the
users to create, register, and delete keys. The key
management component also manages storage for the
various key management schemes. It includes encrypted
storage for sensitive information (e.g., private keys), that is
protected by a master password set by the user when first
running MessageGuard. Finally, we note that while all the
prototypes we have built with MessageGuard have only
used a single key management scheme at a time,
10. Support for a file upload overlay is also nearing completion.
Figure 7. Interface for creating keys using a shared password.
MessageGuard supports prototypes that permit users to
pick and choose which key management schemes they
want to use for which messages.
4.5.1. Default Functionality. We have created three
reference key management schemes for use in
MessageGuard:
• PGP. We have created a standard-compliant
implementation of PGP. This implementation
generates 2048-bit keys for users, and publishes these
keys for discovery on the MessageGuard’s key server
web service. The PGP private key pair is stored in the
user’s browser, but is encrypted using the key
manager’s master password.
• Identity-based encryption (IBE). We have
implemented the Boneh-Boyen IBE scheme [29] for
use in MessageGuard. The key server web service is
responsible for storing the system parameters and
master secret. Clients automatically generate public
keys based on recipient identifiers. The private key is
retrieved from the key server and stored in the user’s
browser, but is encrypted using the key manager’s
master password.
• Shared Password. Finally, we have created a key
management scheme where emails are encrypted
using passwords shared between users. These
passwords are transformed into key material through
the use of the PBKDF2 function. This key
management scheme does not use the key server, and
users are responsible for sharing their passwords out
of band. The derived key material can either be stored
in the user’s browser and encrypted by the key
manager’s master password, or users can re-enter
their shared passwords each time they want to encrypt
or decrypt a message.11
Figure 7 is an example of the interfaces users see when
adding a key to MessageGuard.
4.6. Web Services
To help researchers in creating systems using
MessageGuard, we have created two web services that
11. We have created one key management scheme for each behavior.
inter-operate with MessageGuard: a key server and a file
server. The code for both servers is in MessageGuard’s
code repository, and researchers are welcome to have their
prototypes point at our key server and file server, or
deploy their own.
4.6.1. Key Server. To facilitate key management schemes
that require discovery of public keys (e.g., PGP, S/MIME)
or require key escrow (e.g., IBE) we have created a key
server. The key server requires that users create an account
with a username and a password. After account creation,
users prove their ownership of other accounts (e.g., email,
Twitter, Facebook). Once a user has established ownership
of an account, ownership cannot be transferred to another
owner unless first released by the original owner.
This key server exposes two sets of REST endpoints:
public and private. The public endpoints are used to
retrieve public data (e.g., public keys, IBE system
parameters). The private endpoints are limited to users that
have proved ownership of the appropriate account (e.g.,
setting a public key for a given email address, retrieving
private IBE keys, etc.).
Both the PGP and IBE key management schemes we
have included with MessageGuard make use of the key
server. For the PGP scheme, users upload their public keys
to the key server (via private endpoint), and other users
download those public keys as needed (via public
endpoint). For IBE, users can query the key server for the
system parameters (via public endpoint), and also retrieve
their private keys (via private endpoint). We welcome
other researchers to use our publicly available key server,
but they can also deploy their own as needed with the
code hosted in the repository.
4.6.2. File Server. We have created a file server that allows
for capability-based storage of files. Currently, the file server
allows anyone to upload a file, after which they are given
a capability (i.e., UID) that can be used to access that file.
While we currently do not require authentication to the key
server, that is something that could easily be added.
In practice, we use the file server to enable
attachments in encrypted email. In our work using
MessageGuard to build a secure integrated email
prototype, we were not able to use the underlying email
application’s native file attachment functionality, and
instead relied upon the file server to store encrypted
attachments. This was done by encrypting the attachment
with a random key, and storing the encrypted file sans key
on the file server. The encryption key, a cryptographic
hash of the attachment, and the capability for the
attachment are stored in the encrypted email. As such,
only individuals who can decrypt the email message are
able to access and decrypt the attachment.
4.7. Implementation
We implemented MessageGuard so that it would run
on all major desktop browsers (i.e., Chrome, Firefox,
Internet Explorer, Opera, Safari) and mobile browsers (i.e.,
Android, iOS, Windows Phone). We employed only
standard JavaScript functions that were confirmed to work
on all major browsers.12 We avoided injecting polyfills into
the web application and polluting the window object in an
effort to ensure that MessageGuard did not break existing
web applications. MessageGuard is implemented as both a
browser extension and as a bookmarklet (i.e., user script).
MessageGuard has a single codebase, with only a
small portion of code that is used to address differences in
various browsers (¡1%). This codebase is implemented in
JavaScript, Sass, and HTML. The code is compiled into
browser extensions and a bookmarklet using NodeJS and
Gulp. The code itself is split into a number of JavaScript
modules which are bundled together at compile time using
Browserify. Browserify also allows MessageGuard to
leverage a large number of quality NodeJS modules (e.g.,
CryptoJS, jQuery, Bootstrap). The build system also
generates source maps to facilitate debugging, runs style
checking on the code, and generates documentation using
JSDoc. Instructions for setting up and building
MessageGuard are available in MessageGuard’s repository.
Further details regarding the technologies used to
implement MessageGuard can be found in Appendix §2.
5. MessageGuard as a Research Platform
In this section, we describe the ways researchers can
employ MessageGuard as a platform for their own
research. In addition to the details described in this
section, we invite researchers to download
MessageGuard’s source code. To help researchers quickly
familiarize themselves with MessageGuard’s code base, we
have included instructive comments throughout the code
and have provided a reference implementation that
supports most websites.13 that researchers can refer to as
they build their own systems.
MessageGuard was designed to minimize the amount
of code that must be changed in order for researchers to
build new prototypes. The customizable classes enabling
this rapid prototyping are shown in Figure 8.
MessageGuard includes a default instantiation for each of
the base classes (e.g. ControllerBase) seen in the
figure. To change the global functionality of
MessageGuard, researchers need to change the
aforementioned default implementations. If researchers
desire to implement new functionality (e.g., create a new
overlay, support a new application), they can instead
subclass these base classes. All classes, both base classes
and default implementations, can be extended, but only
allow researchers to override the methods that are unique
to their functionality.
12. http://caniuse.com/.
13. The code base also includes an implementation of secure email as
an additional reference.
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Figure 8. MessageGuard’s customizable framework.
5.1. Frontend
The main class is responsible for parsing the URL and
instantiating the appropriate controller (i.e., classes
extending ControllerBase). Frontend controllers are
responsible for the actual operations of the frontend,
including detecting when overlays are needed and placing
those overlays. Every overlay is created by and coupled to
an overlay manager, which is responsible for handling
communication between the overlay and MessageGuard’s
frontend. Currently, MessageGuard provides overlay
managers for both reading and composing encrypted
content.
The simplest way to modify the frontend is to change
the elements that it will overlay. This can be done by
changing the CSS selector that is passed to
ControllerBase’s constructor.14 The controller can
also be configured to support additional types of overlays
(i.e., creating a unified read and compose overlay for
instant messaging clients). In this case, it will also be
necessary to create an overlay manager to communicate
with the new overlay.
Using these base classes, MessageGuard’s default
functionality was implemented using less than 200 lines of
JavaScript.
5.2. Overlays
Overlays are composed of both HTML interfaces and
JavaScript code. Researchers can either modify the existing
overlays (read and compose), or create their own overlays.
The steps for creating a new overlay modifying overlays on
a per application basis are as follows:
14. Though unlikely to be necessary, it is also possible to modify the
controller to do more complex selection that does not rely on CSS selection.
1) Create a new HTML file for each overlay. This will
define the visual appearance of the overlay.
2) Create a custom read, compose, or entirely new
overlay (e.g., file upload) by extending either the
OverlayBase class or one the reference overlays
(read and compose). These parent classes provide
basic functionality (e.g., positioning, communication
with the frontend).
3) Connect the overlay’s HTML interface to its controlling
code by referencing this new JavaScript class in the
new HTML.
4) Create a new overlay manager to work with the new
overlay. You can extend any of the existing overlay
managers, or create a new one by extending
OverlayManagerBase.
5) Add any custom communication code to both the new
overlay and overlay manager.
MessageGuard’s default read overlay required 70 lines
of HTML and 150 lines of JavaScript to implement. The
default compose overlay needed 190 lines of HTML and
670 lines of JavaScript, most of which was responsible for
setting up the HTML5 rich-text interface and allowing users
to select a specific key for encryption.
5.3. Packager
By overriding PackagerBase, it is possible to create
custom message packages, allowing MessageGuard to
support a wide range of content-based encryption
protocols. This functionality can be used to allow
prototypes developed with MessageGuard to inter-operate
with existing cryptographic systems (e.g., using the PGP
package syntax in order to be compatible with existing
PGP clients). It could also be used to experiment with
advanced cryptographic features, such as key
ratcheting [7].
5.4. Key Management
Key management is one of the most poorly understand
areas of usable, content-based encryption. While there are
many advocates of particular key management schemes
(e.g., PGP), there has been little work to actually analyze
the empirical usability of these schemes. One key goal of
MessageGuard is to allow existing proposals for key
management to be implemented in a real system, and then
compared against alternative schemes. As such, we took
special care to ensure that MessageGuard would be
compatible with all key management schemes we are
currently aware of.
In order to create a new key management scheme, the
following two classes must be implemented:
KeyScheme. The KeyScheme is responsible for
handling scheme-specific UI functionality for the key
manager (e.g., importing public/private keys, authenticating
to a key server). The KeyScheme methods are:
• getUI Retrieves a scheme-specific UI that will be
included with the KeyUIManager’s generic UI. This
method is provided with the KeySystem being
created/updated and a callback which notifies the
KeyUIManager that the KeySystem is ready to be
saved.
• handleError Modifies an existing KeySystem’s UI to
allow it to address an error. This method is provided
with details about the error, the KeySystem UI to
modify, and a callback which notifies the
KeyUIManager that the error has been resolved.
Examples of errors include not having a necessary
key or expired authentication credentials.
• create Creates a KeySystem from the scheme-specific
UI provided to this method.
• update Updates a KeySystem from the scheme-specific
UI provided to this method.
KeySystem. A KeySystem is an instantiation of a key
management scheme that allows the users to decrypt/sign
data for a single identity and encrypt/verify data for any
number of identities.15 A KeySystem is responsible for
performing cryptographic operations with the keys it
manages. Every KeySystem has a fingerprint that uniquely
identifies it. The KeySystem methods are:
• serialize/deserialize Prepares data that is not a part of
the KeyAttributes type for storage by the KeyStorage
class.
• encrypt Encrypts data for the provided identity.
Returns the encrypted data along with the fingerprint
of the KeySystem that can decrypt it.
• decrypt Decrypts the provided data.
• sign Signs the provided data.
• verify Verifies that the provided signature is valid for
the provided data.
By default, MessageGuard will allow users to use all
available key management schemes, though this can be
overridden on a per-prototype basis.
6. Validation
We evaluated MessageGuard ability to support usable,
content-based encryption research on a wide range of
platforms. Additionally, we measured the performance
overhead that MessageGuard creates. Our results indicate
that MessageGuard is compatible with most web
applications and has minimal performance overhead.
6.1. Ubiquity
We tested MessageGuard on major browsers and it
worked in all cases: Desktop – Chrome, Firefox, Internet
Explorer, Opera, and Safari. Android – Chrome, Firefox,
Opera. iOS – Chrome, Mercury, Safari.
We tested MessageGuard on the Alexa top 50 web
sites. One of the sites is not a web application (t.co) and
another requires a Chinese phone number in order to use it
15. Key systems which don’t support recipients set
canHaveRecipients to false and ignore the identity parameters.
Stage Static Dynamic
n 100 500 1000 100 500 1000
Chrome1 1.14 0.84 0.95 3.17 6.49 11.0
Firefox1 1.06 0.99 0.96 2.26 3.15 4.45
Safari1 0.45 0.63 0.53 3.73 12.8 25.5
Chrome2 4.27 4.39 4.60 12.9 30.2 51.1
Chrome3 5.68 5.97 5.94 12.4 32.0 61.2
Safari3 2.57 2.46 1.79 15.1 25.2 39.5
1 MacBook Air (OSX 10.10.3, 1.7GHz Core i7, 8GB RAM).
Chrome – 42.0.2311.135, Firefox – 37.0.2, Safari – 8.0.5.
2 OnePlus One (CyanogenMod 12S, AOSP 5.1, 64GB).
Chrome – 42.0.2311.47.
3 iPad Air (iOS 8.3, 1st gen, 64GB).
Chrome – 42.0.2311.47, Safari – 8.0.
TABLE 1. AVERAGE TIME TO OVERLAY AN ELEMENT (MS)
(weibo.com). MessageGuard was able to encrypt data in
47 of the 48 remaining web applications. The one site that
failed (youtube.com) did so because the application
removed the comments field when it lost focus, which
happens when focus switched to MessageGuard’s compose
overlay. We were able to address this problem with a
customized front end that required only five lines of code
to implement.
These results indicate that researchers should be able to
use MessageGuard to research content-based encryption for
the web applications of their choice with little difficulty.
6.2. Performance
We profiled MessageGuard on several popular web
applications and analyzed MessageGuard’s impact on load
times. In each case, we started the profiler, reloaded the
page, and stopped profiling once the page was loaded. Our
results show that MessageGuard has little impact on page
load times and does not degrade the user’s experience as
they surf the Web: Facebook – 0.93%, Gmail – 2.92%,
Disqus – 0.54%, Twitter – 1.98%.
Since MessageGuard is intended to work with all
websites, we created a synthetic web app that allowed us
to test MessageGuard’s performance in extreme situations.
This app measures MessageGuard’s performance when
overlaying static content present at page load (Stage 1)
and when overlaying dynamic content that is added to the
page after load (Stage 2). The application takes as input n,
the number elements that will be overlayed in each stage.
Half of these elements will require read overlays and half
will require compose overlays.
Using this synthetic web application, we tested
MessageGuard with six browsers and three values of n.
We averaged measurements over ten runs and report our
findings in Table 1. Performance for overlaying static
content does not significantly vary based on the number of
overlays created. In contrast, performance for overlaying
dynamic content for most browsers seems to grow
polynomial in the number of overlays added. Still,
Figure 9. A unified overlay for Facebook Chat.
performance in the Firefox desktop browser demonstrates
that this is not an inherent limitation of MessageGuard.
Finally, we note that even in extreme cases (dynamic -
n = 1000) overlaying occurs quickly (max 61 ms).
MessageGuard’s low performance overhead indicates it
is suitable for building responsive prototypes, suitable for
testing by users. Moreover, if performance problems arise,
researchers can be reasonably sure that the problems are in
their changes to MessageGuard.
7. Case Studies
While developing MessageGuard, we developed two
content-based encryption prototypes using MessageGuard:
a secure Facebook Chat prototype and a secure email
prototype. In this section we describe these prototypes, the
effort taken to build them, and IRB-approved usability
studies of these prototypes. These case studies demonstrate
that MessageGuard enables building high quality research
prototypes that are well-liked by users.
7.1. Private Facebook Chat
Using an early version of MessageGuard, we created
Private Facebook Chat (PFC), a system that adds
content-based encryption to chat on Facebook [30]. PFC
leverages identity-based encryption (IBE) in order to
transparently manage encryption keys, removing the need
for users to establish shared secrets or obtain public keys
in before sending chat messages.
PFC uses a custom controller that detects the Facebook
Chat interface. Instead of having separate read and
compose overlays, PFC uses a single unified overlay that
handles displaying and composing encrypted messages
(see Figure 9). Using a single overlay was advantageous
because it was more space efficient and better mimicked a
typical instant messaging interface.16
16. In general, we recommend this approach for instant messaging
clients.
Figure 10. Customized MessageGuard front end for email.
We conducted an IRB-approved user study of PFC
involving 17 participants. Almost all users were able to
use PFC to encrypt their chat sessions, except two
extremely novice users that were unable to complete any
tasks. Additionally, users indicated that they were
generally satisfied with PFC and that they would be
interested in using it in practice.
The Facebook Chat prototype took a single student
working part-time one month to complete (about 80
hours). Most of this time was spent designing the interface
for the unified overlay and modifying MessageGuard’s
IBE key management scheme to support authentication
through Facebook Connect. In total, PFC’s implementation
required 50 lines of HTML and 350 lines of JavaScript.
7.2. Private Webmail (Pwm)
The design of MessageGuard was guided by our
development of a series of secure email prototypes for
Gmail [2], [16], [17] that we used to study usable, secure
email for the masses. These prototypes all go by the name
Private Webmail (Pwm). Pwm uses identity-based
encryption (IBE) to allow users to send encrypted email to
recipients who have not yet installed Pwm, something that
is not possible with PGP or S/MIME. In addition, Pwm
focuses on helping first time users understand how to
decrypt their first secure email and how to use Pwm to
encrypt messages.
In order to maximize Pwm’s integration with Gmail we
created a customized front end that annotates Gmail’s
interface. Our specialized front annotates Gmail’s interface
to help users understand better how their email is
protected (see Figure 10). We also added the ability for
users to include a plaintext greeting with their encrypted
emails, helping recipients feel safe when receiving
encrypted email. Additionally, we added context-sensitive,
inline tutorials that instructed users on how to use Pwm
and what protections it affords their email.
We have evaluated Pwm across five different
IRB-approved usability studies, including a total of 186
participants. Each of these studies utilized a standard
usability metric, the System Usability Scale (SUS) [31],
[32], which generates a single score between 0 and 100
that is an indication of a system’s usability. SUS consists
of ten discriminating questions that users answer after
completing tasks using MessageGuard.
The first three user studies all involved the same
version of Pwm, with the first study (25 participants)
having participants install Pwm using a bookmarklet, and
the second (32 participants) and third study (28
participants) having participants install Pwm using an
extension [2]. In each of the three studies, recipients were
told to wait for an email containing information needed to
continue the study, though they were not informed that this
email would be encrypted. They were then sent the
encrypted email, and were required to decrypt this email,
before continuing to send and reply to several more
encrypted emails. Overall, Pwm averaged a SUS score of
73.8, putting it in the 70th percentile of systems tested
with SUS — first study (75.7), second study (70.7), third
study (70.7).
Qualitative feedback from these three studies revealed
that we had made the encryption and key management
details too transparent and users were unsure whether or
not to trust the system. This caused us to modify our
design to make some encryption details more apparent in
the interface [17]. Using this modified version of Pwm, we
conducted our fourth usability study. It involved 51
participants that experimented with the bookmarklet
version of MessageGuard and incorporated changes based
on the results of prior studies. The results of this test was
a SUS score of 80.0, falling in the 88th percentile of
systems tested with SUS. More importantly, our
modifications to Pwm (which were also incorporated into
MessageGuard’s reference implementation) succeeded in
addressing user concerns. Nearly all participants (92%)
believed that their friends and family could easily start
using it.
Our fifth study examined whether Pwm could be
adopted in a grassroots fashion [18]. To test this, we
brought in pairs of novice users, and instructed the first
participant to send an encrypted email to the second
participant. The first participant was only given a link to
Pwm, while the second user was not informed that they
would be using encrypted email. In this study, Pwm
received a SUS score of 72.3, falling in the 63rd percentile
of systems tested with SUS.17 Furthermore, all users
successfully used Pwm to begin transmitting encrypted
emails between themselves, and most users praised Pwm’s
tutorials and intuitive interfaces.
As Pwm was developed in lock-step with
MessageGuard, it is difficult to know exactly how much
time was spent specifically on Pwm specific functionality,
though we estimate around 150 hours. Most of this time
was spent reverse engineering Gmail’s interface, which is
17. In this study we also examined other systems, all of which received
uncharacteristically low scores, suggesting that Pwm’s true SUS score is
much closer to the 80 found in our fourth study.
difficult because is dynamically generated and minimizes
both HTML and JavaScript. We also spent significant time
creating and refining Pwm’s tutorials. In total, Pwm
includes approximately 1300 news lines of JavaScript.
7.3. Lessons Learned
Both case studies demonstrate that it is possible to
rapidly build content-based encryption prototypes using
MessageGuard. While these prototypes still required some
time to implement (80 and 150 hours), this pales in
comparison to the nearly 2000 hours that have already
gone into the development of MessageGuard. Our work
with Pwm especially helped us see the value of comparing
competing systems; lab usability studies have been
particularly helpful in helping us to differentiate between
the usability of several different secure email systems.
Finally, these case studies demonstrate that MessageGuard
can be used to build prototypes that are rated by users as
being highly usable. This is especially important in the
case of Pwm, as Pwm’s interfaces are highly similar to the
interfaces used in MessageGuard’s default functionality.
8. Conclusion
We described MessageGuard, a platform for usable
security research focused on content-based encryption.
MessageGuard is designed to encourage collaboration
between the security and usability research communities to
solve longstanding usability problems in this space. It
simplifies development of prototypes and comparison of
competing designs, while also providing a platform for
sharing and replicating research results. MessageGuard
retrofits existing applications, providing broad utility to
developers, and includes secure cryptographic operations
so that usability is tested on functioning systems. We
validated the performance and deployability of
MessageGuard and shared several case studies
demonstrating its utility for the field. Our hope is that
MessageGuard will help security and usability researchers
to cooperate in solving numerous pressing problems and
speed the adoption of usable, content-based encryption.
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Appendix
1. Implementation Strategies
To determine the appropriate implementation strategy
for MessageGuard, we examined approaches for enhancing
web applications with content-based encryption. In this
section, analyze these approaches with respect to their
deployability, security, and usability. We group the
implementation strategies into two categories: integrated
strategies and non-integrated strategies. We also propose
two new hybrid strategies that address limitations in the
existing strategies and are better suited to meet our system
goals.
1.1. Integrated Strategies. Integrated strategies attempt to
add content-based encryption directly to the interfaces of
existing websites. In a process known as overlaying [19],
the browser can replace portions of the website’s interface
with secure interfaces known as overlays.These overlays are
displayed as if they were a part of the web application, but
their contents are inaccessible to the web application. Often,
there are different overlays for different functions, such as
composing textual content, uploading files, and decrypting
content.
iFrame. The oldest integrated strategy is to create
overlays using HTML iFrames [2], [19]. Since iFrames are
a part of the browser’s DOM, it is trivial to integrate them
with websites. Further, iFrames are protected by the
browser’s same-origin policy. There are three methods for
overlaying websites with iFrames:
1) Browser extension. Extensions are desktop only,
except in the case of Firefox on Android.
2) Bookmarklet. Bookmarklets are user scripts that are
stored as browser bookmarks. When a user clicks a
bookmarklet, the associated script is executed on the
current page. Bookmarklets are supported on all
platforms, both desktop and mobile, and do not
require users to install any software.
When using bookmarklets, the iFrame’s src attribute
will need to reference a trusted remote domain. To
maximize security, this domain should only host the
contents needed by the bookmarklet’s user script.
This limited functionality makes it easier to lock
down the domain’s servers in order to prevent an
intrusion by the adversary.
Bookmarklets are affected by the browser’s Content
Security Policy (CSP), which can be used to limit the
source of frames and scripts. Still, this limitation has
been marked as a bug in Chromium18 and Firefox,19
and it is possible that in the future this limitation will
be removed. In practice, only a small number of
websites use CSP.
3) Proxy application. A proxy application can be used
to augment the bookmarklet approach. First, it can
modify the CSP settings of a website to allow
iFrame’s to reference the system’s trusted domain.
Second, a proxy can automatically inject the
bookmarklet script into a webpage, obviating the need
for the user to click the bookmarklet. Third, a proxy
can allow the iFrame strategy to work with
non-browser applications that display HTML interface
elements retrieved from the web. A proxy application
can work on any platform, except for Windows on
mobile devices. Still, there are two significant
drawbacks to this approach: (1) for non-rooted
phones, the proxy must be implemented using the
phone’s VPN service and (2) it must proxy HTTPS
connections in order to modify their contents.
In prior work, we used iFrames to develop Pwm, a
secure email client for the masses [2]. Pwm tightly
integrated with Gmail and was designed to maximize
usability. Pwm focused on helping first time recipients of
an encrypted email understand how to install Pwm and
decrypt their message. Pwm was rated as highly usable by
participants in several usability studies. Since our work on
Pwm, additional systems in both research [15] and
industry (e.g., Virtru, Mailvelope) have also used the
iFrame strategy to secure email.
Shadow DOM. Shadow DOM is a new feature
proposed in the HTML5 specification, and currently has a
partial implementation in Blink-based browsers (e.g.,
Chrome). The Shadow DOM allows for the creation of a
“shadow” DocumentFragment (i.e., ShadowRoot)
that will be rendered in place of another fragment (i.e.,
host) on the website. Elements contained in the
ShadowRoot are invisible to the rest of the DOM and
must be accessed through their parent ShadowRoot. For
example, document.getElementById cannot find
children of a ShadowRoot.
Overlays can be implemented using a ShadowRoot.
However, while ShadowRoot objects and their contents
should only be accessible to the entity that created the
ShadowRoot object, in practice this is not the case:
1) The Shadow DOM allows for an element to have
multiple ShadowRoots, with the newest
ShadowRoot having access to older ShadowRoot
objects through their olderShadowRoot property.
2) There are two CSS selectors that “pierce” the Shadow
DOM. First the “>>>” selector can be used to grab
18. https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=233903
19. https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show bug.cgi?id=866522
any element that matches the selectors to the right of
“>>>”, regardless of whether that element is inside
a ShadowRoot. Similarly, the “::shadow”
pseudo-selector can be used to select the
ShadowRoot attached to any element.
3) The Element.prototype.createShadowRoot
method
can be replaced by the web application with a version
that saves references to the created ShadowRoots,
allowing the web application to access the contents of
these ShadowRoots.
In order to implement overlays using a ShadowRoot,
it is necessary to modify the JavaScript environment to
address these access methods [14]. Because of this
limitation, ShadowDOM cannot be implemented using a
bookmarklet, which cannot guarantee that the JavaScript
environment is modified before the website has the ability
to store pointers to these access methods. Instead, a
Shadow DOM strategy must be implemented using either
an extension or a proxy application.
He et al. used the Shadow DOM to implement
ShadowCrypt, a Chrome extension that attempted to add
secure communication to arbitrary websites [14]. In our
experience, usability issues keep ShadowCrypt from
working with most websites. Moreover, flaws in
ShadowCrypt’s implementation allow the website to
retrieve the user’s sensitive data.20 This demonstrates the
danger of relying on non-standard security models created
by developers.
Greasemonkey. Greasemonkey is a Firefox plugin that
allows for websites to be modified with custom interface
elements defined using XUL. XUL interface elements can
be used for overlays, and the contents of these interfaces are
protected by the browser’s sandboxing of websites [33].
Fahl et al. used Greasemonkey to create a Firefox
extension that added content-based encryption to Dropbox,
Facebook, and email [13]. Their plugin used
Confidentiality-as-a-Service (CaaS) to automate key
management. Usability studies demonstrate that their
system was highly usable.
Accessibility. Most operating systems have an
accessibility layer that is used by accessibility tools to
modify apps to make them usable by individuals with
disabilities. Lau et al. proposed using the accessibility
layer to implement secure overlays [20]. In this strategy,
the content of secure overlays is protected by the
browser’s sandbox. While our work is concerned with
encrypting content within the browser, the accessibility
layer is interesting in that it has the potential to secure
non-browser applications. While iFrames implemented
using a proxy application can also support non-browser
applications, the accessibility layer has the potential to be
more universal and reliable.
Lau et al. used this strategy to develop Mimesis Aegis
(M-Aegis), a system for enhancing Android apps with
content-based encryption. Their system secured several
20. A detailed description of this problem is given later in the appendix.
communication apps (e.g., Gmail) and also provided a
method for support to be added for additional apps.21 A
usability study of the Android Gmail app secured with
M-Aegis showed that most participants did not report any
noticeable difference between the original Gmail app and
the Gmail app with M-Aegis enabled.
1.2. Non-integrated Strategies. In contrast to integrated
strategies, non-integrated strategies use separate
applications to provide encryption, relying on the user to
copy-and-paste encrypted content in and out of the original
application. Because these applications are not integrated
with websites, they are free to make UI design choices
that maximize usability, without any concern that these
choices will clash with a website’s UI.
Standalone website. A standalone website can be used
to handle encryption and decryption. While it is not
integrated with websites, it is integrated with the browser.
Since a browser is used to run the website, no installation
is required. Security is provided by the browser’s
same-origin policy. This approach is not common, but
there have been a few standalone websites that provide
PGP encryption.22
Standalone Application. A standalone application is
the traditional strategy for implementing content-based
encryption. Security is provided by the operating system’s
app separation policies.
The earliest example of a standalone content-based
encryption application is Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). PGP
was created in 1991 by Phil Zimmerman and is used to
protect a wide range of data. Since then, many similar
programs have been created.
1.3. Comparison. We have analyzed and compared each of
the above strategies based on their deployability, usability,
and security. The results are summarized in Table 2.
Deployability. There are three key areas of
deployability: which browsers are supported, which
desktop operating systems are supported, and which
mobile devices are supported. Both the Greasemonkey and
Shadow DOM strategies are limited to a single type of
browser, Firefox and Blink-based, respectively. On mobile,
Greasemonkey only works with Firefox on Android and
the Shadow DOM requires the use of a proxy application,
which as mentioned earlier is less than ideal (marked as
“Partial support” in Table 2). Greasemonkey uses XUL,
which is slated for deprecation. On the other hand,
Shadow DOM is part of the HTML5 specification and
there is a good chance that sometime in the future it will
become standard in more browsers.
The deployment challenge faced by both the
accessibility and standalone app strategy is that every
platform, both desktop and mobile, requires its own
implementation. For standalone apps, this burden could be
21. This method is not generic and requires custom logic for each
supported application.
22. For example, https://www.igolder.com/pgp/encryption/ and http://
www.hanewin.net/encrypt/PGcrypt.htm.
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Security Model
iFrame          G# G# G#5  G# G#5 Same-origin
Shadow DOM G#2 # # G#2 # #    G# G# #  G# # None
Greasemonkey1 #  # # # #    G# # #  G# # Browser Sandbox
Accessibility      G#3 #4 G# G# G# # #  G# # Browser Sandbox
Standalone website             #6   Same-origin
Standalone App       G# G# G# G# G# G# #  # Browser Sandbox
 Full support, G# Partial support, # No support
1 Scheduled for deprecation.
2 ShadowDOM is not fully supported in Chrome.
3 Depends on whether the browser is accessible.
4 In development – AT-SPI [34].
5 Potentially limited by CSP.
6 Integrated with the browser, but not the website.
TABLE 2. COMPARISON OF IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES
reduced through the use of a cross-platform framework
(e.g., Java, Mono), though these frameworks commonly
lead to systems with a poor look-and-feel. Unfortunately,
there is not a cross-platform accessibility layer and each
platform does require a unique implementation. These
limitations have been marked in Table 2 using the “Partial
support” symbol.
Both iFrames and standalone websites are built on
commonly deployed approaches, and work on all
platforms and browsers. iFrames on mobile can be
implemented using either bookmarklets or an application
proxy. In the case of bookmarklets, iFrames are limited by
websites’ CSP policies, and in the case of a proxy
application on mobile devices, there is the degradation of
user experience (marked as “Partial support” in Table 2).
Usability. The standalone strategies suffer from a lack
of integration, which is disliked by users [2], [15]. On the
other hand, because the standalone strategies are not tied
to the website’s interface, the standalone strategies support
non-standard interfaces (e.g., input field drawn using an
HTML canvas). While the integrated strategies could
contain logic to handle website-specific interfaces, this
approach is a significant engineering effort (marked as
“Partial support” in Table 2).
The standalone website strategy does not require
installation. When the iFrame strategy is implemented
using bookmarklets, there is also no installation.
Security. The Greasemonkey, accessibility, and
standalone app strategies all rely on the browser’s sandbox
for security [33]. The sandbox prevents websites from
being able to access any resources outside of the websites
DOM, including the browser chrome (Greasemonkey) and
other applications (accessibility, standalone app). While the
browser’s sandbox has been compromised in the past, such
attacks are quickly patched [35].
The iFrame and standalone website strategies rely on
the browser’s same-origin policy for security [36], [37]. As
part of this policy, browsers ensure that code executing on
an arbitrary website is unable to access or modify content
hosted on a different domain (i.e., iFrame, standalone
website). This is an important model that provides security
for much of the web [3].
Similar to compromises of the browser sandbox, from
time to time the same-origin policy is partially broken. For
example, in 2013 Paul Stone described an attack that used
CSS and measurements of render times to leak the contents
of an iFrame [38]. After disclosure of this flaw, the browser
vendors worked with Stone and quickly addressed the issue.
This is the advantage of relying on a security model actively
supported by browsers: problems are quickly fixed.
Shadow DOM is the one approach that does not rely
on a standard security model, but instead requires
developers to modify the JavaScript environment to
prevent websites from accessing the contents of a
ShadowRoot. The dangers of this approach can be seen
through a security analysis we conducted of ShadowCrypt.
We downloaded the latest version of ShadowCrypt23 and
found two attacks that allowed web applications to read
plaintext data stored in the secure overlays. The JavaScript
to run these attacks and explanation of why they work are
given in Figure 11
These attacks demonstrate two problems with relying
on developers to add security to the Shadow DOM. First,
it is difficult for developers to correctly identify all attack
vectors and correctly close them (Figure 11 – Attack 1).
Second, as browsers are updated, it is possible that new
attack vectors are added, and developers must be constantly
vigilant (Figure 11 – Attack 2).
JavaScript-based Cryptography. The iFrame, Shadow
DOM, Greasemonkey, and standalone website strategies all
rely upon cryptographic primitives implemented in
JavaScript. There have been concerns that in certain cases
JavaScript-based cryptography is untrustworthy [39]. These
arguments reduce to two different concerns. First, if
cryptography is being used because TLS is not trusted by
23. Version 0.3.3, released February 4, 2015.
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TABLE 3. COMPARISON OF HYBRID STRATEGIES
1 var e l e m e n t s = document .
q u e r y S e l e c t o r A l l ('[contentEditable
]' ) ;
2 f o r ( var i = 0 , l e n = e l e m e n t s . l e n g t h
; i < l e n ; i ++) {
3 var newShadowRoot = e l e m e n t s [ i ] .
c r ea t eShadowRoot ( ) ;
4 newShadowRoot . innerHTML = '<shadow
></shadow>' ;
5 i f ( newShadowRoot . o lderShadowRoot )
6 c o n s o l e . l o g ( newShadowRoot .
o lderShadowRoot . q u e r y S e l e c t o r (
'textarea' ) . v a l u e ) ;
7 }
Attack 1. Steals content from ShadowCrypt elements by
creating a new ShadowRoot and using it to access
ShadowCrypt’s ShadowRoot. ShadowCrypt stores content
in a TextArea and so we extract it from there.
This attack is possible because ShadowCrypt deletes
the Document.createShadowRoot function instead
of the Document.prototype.createShadowRoot
function.
1 var t e x t A r e a = document .
q u e r y S e l e c t o r A l l ('*::shadow
textarea' ) ;
2 f o r ( var i = 0 , l e n = t e x t A r e a . l e n g t h
; i < l e n ; i ++) {
3 c o n s o l e . l o g ( t e x t A r e a [ i ] . v a l u e ) ;
4 }
Attack 2. Steals content from ShadowCrypt elements
by using the ::shadow pseudo-selector. This attack is
possible because ShadowCrypt does not filter the “::shadow”
pseudo-selector. Due to frequent changes in the Shadow
DOM specification, it is likely this selector did not exist
when ShadowCrypt was implemented.
Figure 11. Attacks on ShadowCrypt
the website, then the website cannot guarantee that the
JavaScript is delivered to the user’s browser unmodified.
Second, if cryptography is being used to encrypt the data
so that it is opaque to the website, then you cannot trust
the website to send you JavaScript that will encrypt this
data.
Both of these are valid concerns, but are orthogonal to
the strategies that use JavaScript-based cryptography. First,
the strategies do trust TLS to correctly deliver the
content-based encryption software. Second, the strategies
do not trust the website, and that is precisely why the
encryption software is separate from the website. Finally,
except in the case of iFrames implemented using
Bookmarklets, the cryptographic JavaScript code is only
downloaded once, at installation (iFrame, Shadow DOM,
Greasemonkey) or on first run (standalone website).
1.4. Hybrid Strategies. The comparison of
implementation strategies shows that the iFrames and
accessibility strategies best match our goals of retrofitting
the web with content-based encryption. Still, both of these
approaches struggle with non-standard interfaces. To
address this, we suggest that each of these strategies be
modified to fall back to a standalone strategy when users
encounter a non-standard interface that the system was
unable to overlay. We pair strategies that have the same
security model: i.e., iFrame + standalone website
(same-origin) and Accessibility + standalone app (browser
sandbox). The capabilities of these new hybrid approaches
are summarized in Table 3.
Using the hybrid strategies, a bookmarklet
implementation of iFrames can protect websites that don’t
employ CSP, and for those websites that do use CSP, the
implementation can fall back to the standalone website.
This standalone website could be displayed in either a new
window or tab. Alternatively, when a user encounters a
non-standard interface that is not overlayed, they could
click a button to launch the standalone website. This
allows iFrames to fully support mobile platforms without
using a proxy application. Additionally, this means that the
no-install implementation of iFrames (i.e., bookmarklets)
is available for all browsers and platforms.
1.5. Best Strategy. Based on our goal of retrofitting the
web with content-based encryption, the hybrid strategy
iFrames + standalone website is the best strategy. It
works with all current browsers and platforms, both
mobile and desktop. Furthermore, in most situations it
provides tight integration with websites, but can fall back
to a standalone website when non-standard interfaces are
encountered. Moreover, using bookmarklets, this strategy
can be run on systems where the user does not have install
permissions.
2. Implementation
In this section, we describe in greater depth the technical
implementation of MessageGuard.
2.1. Front End. When initialized, the front end
immediately scans the page using the documents
querySelectorAll and a TreeWalker. After this
initial scan, changes to the page are tracked using a single
MutationObserver and only elements that have been
modified are scanned. This process allows MessageGuard
to have a minimal effect on page load times and
application execution.
Where possible, the front end uses the Shadow DOM
to position overlays (i.e., styling, not security). When the
Shadow DOM is unavailable, as is the case in most
browsers, we instead set the overlay’s style to match the
position and size of the overlayed element, and then set
the overlayed element’s display style to none. This
alternative approach has some potential to interfere with
the underlying application (e.g., :nth-child()) and is
not as desirable as using the Shadow DOM.
2.2. Cryptography. Where ever possible
stark2009symmetric used Node.js’s Crypto library. For
functionality not provided by this library, we used the
Stanford Javascript Crypto Library [40] (SJCL). The only
cryptographic primitives that we had to develop ourselves
were for the implementation of Boneh-Boyen IBE. This
was necessary as there no publicly available
implementations IBE that were suitable for inclusion in
MessageGuard.
2.3. Browser Extension. We developed the MessageGuard
browser extension using Kango, a cross-browser extension
framework. Kango packages MessageGuard and makes it
available as a browser extension for Chrome, Firefox,
Opera, and Safari. Within a browser extension, the front
end is injected into a web application before the web
application is loaded. The overlays, packager, and key
management components operate within the extension’s
trusted origin, protecting them from the web application.
In Safari, browser extensions are subject to the Content
Security Policy (CSP), which prevents MessageGuard from
functioning on sites that set a frame-src CSP attribute.
Until March 10 of this year, the CSP specification
explicitly disallowed applying CSP policies to extensions
and bookmarklets, but the language has since been
weakened to allow browsers to choose whether CSP
protections apply to extensions and bookmarklets [41].
Since Safari’s broken functionality existed before March
10 and because all other browsers exempt extensions from
CSP, we believe it is likely Safari will eventually exempt
extensions as well.
2.4. Bookmarklet. Bookmarklets are user scripts that are
stored as browser bookmarks. When a user clicks a
bookmarklet, the associated script is executed on the
current page. We have implemented MessageGuard so that
it can be executed from a bookmarklet. This is helpful
since mobile browsers do not currently support extensions
but do support bookmarklets.
The browser extension and bookmarklets share the
same codebase and are nearly identical. The only
significant difference is that MessageGuard’s components
are hosted from a standard web origin (e.g.,
https://messageguard.com) instead of the local extension
origin. If MessageGuard’s origin was compromised, it
would be possible for an attacker to inject malicious
scripts into user’s browsers. To help mitigate this, we
recommend that MessageGuard’s bookmarklet be hosted
on an origin with no other responsibilities, allowing this
origin to be significantly locked down.
Bookmarklets are not currently exempted from CSP
protections, but this has already been marked as a bug in
Chromium24 and Firefox.25
24. https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=233903
25. https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show bug.cgi?id=866522
